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Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?
Abstract
There has been much recent jurisprudential discussion of 'hard' and 'easy' cases in the law. This 'academic'
debate has been complemented by the increasing willingness by judges to sanction lawyers for making
frivolous' legal arguments, which are prohibited by both United States and Canadian law. To identify the
attributes of a frivolous case has proved no easy matter. A focus on the nature of frivolous cases, moreover,
requires us to recognize how different the phenomenology of lawyering is from that of judging and the
concomitant importance of integrating the practice of lawyering into our jurisprudence. This; in turn,
necessitates that we move away from the almost exclusive concentration on the practice of judging.
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FRIVOLOUS CASES: DO LAWYERS
REALLY KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL?
By SANFORD LEVINSON*
There has been much recent jurisprudential discussion of 'hard' and 'easy' cases
in the law. This 'academic'debate has been complemented by the increasing willingness
by judges to sanction lawyers for making frivolous' legal arguments, which are
prohibited by both United States and Canadian law. To identify the attributes of
a frivolous case has proved no easy matter. A focus on the nature offrivolous cases,
moreover, requires us to recognize how different the phenomenology of lawyering
is from that of judging and the concomitant importance of integrating the practice
of lawyering into our jurisprudence. This; in turn, necessitates that we move away
from the almost exclusive concentration on the practice ofjudging.
I. INTRODUCTION
I assume that one of the reasons for your inviting me to present
this lecture involves work that I have already done. It thus presumably
will come as no surprise that my remarks relate to that body of work,
in two different ways.
I have been attracted, perhaps like a moth to the flame, by problems
arising from the lawyer's task of interpreting documents. In my case,
I have tended to focus on the interpretive problems surrounding a particular
document - the United States Constitution. As Professor Hirsch has
said, "With a numinous document like the Constitution or the Bible,
the principles and methods of correct interpretation are as important
as they are problematical."' What Hirsch evokes is the classic debate
© Copyright, 1986, Sanford Levinson.
* Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. This article was originally delivered
as the Eighth Annual 'Or 'Emet Lecture at the Osgoode Hall Law School on 3 April 1986. Although
I have revised some of my remarks and expanded some of the footnotes, I have left the text substantially
as delivered. I want to express my deep gratitude to the faculty of the School for inviting me
and for responding to the ideas I am trying to develop. I am particularly grateful to Marc Gold,
Allan Hutchinson, Leslie Green, and Peter Hogg.
As always, I am also grateful to several of my colleagues at the University of Texas Law
School for their willingness to endure seemingly endless new drafts and formulations and other
interruptions of their own work. Particular mention should be made of Mark Yudof, Douglas Laycock,
William Powers, and Scot Powe; John Dzienkowski not only read the entire manuscript but also
provided especially valuable counsel in regard to the problem of administrative non-acquiescence
to judicial decisions. Professors Robert Post and Ted Schneyer also reviewed the manuscript and
provided helpful advice. Finally, I received valuable reactions from John McArthur, immersed in
the actual practice of law.
I E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)
at 20.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
about hermeneutic 'science', which focuses on the search for specific
methods that will guarantee 'correct' - or 'truthful' - interpretations
of any document under inspection. Francis Lieber, who wrote the first
English-language book on legal hermeneutics almost 150 years ago,
2
defined hermeneutics as "[t]hat branch of science which establishes the
principles and rules of interpretation and construction." 3 He was well
aware that interpretation of texts would be necessary. "For the very reason
that construction endeavours to arrive at conclusions beyond the absolute
sense of the text, and that it is dangerous on this account, we must strive
the more anxiously to find out safe rules, to guide us on the dangerous
path."4 The debate, of course, is concerned with the question whether
"safe rules" can be developed and, if so, what their content might be.
A vigorous debate is now taking place about the plausibility of asserting
such rules. Some of us, who have expressed rather deep scepticism about
the existence of safe rules, have even been denominated 'legal nihilists',
and the debate has recently moved from the sheer abstractions of literary
theory and jurisprudence into consideration of the suitability of teaching
such 'nihilistic' views to law students.
5
In this paper I shall indeed address the so-called indeterminacy of
textual meaning. However, I am also interested in a distinctly separate
problem, which I call thejurisprudence of lawyering. Although this interest
grows out of my interests in interpretation, it is in fact analytically
distinguishable. Let me, therefore, try to explain my title and thus put
this discussion into a jurisprudential context.
Il. OF CASES HARD AND EASY
It is a notorious truth that both jurisprudence and legal education
tend to emphasize the so-called hard case. Indeed, perhaps the major
article by the most-discussed contemporary jurisprude, Ronald Dworkin,
is entitled "Hard Cases."6 A defining characteristic of such cases is that
2 F. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics or Principles of Interpretation and Construction
in Law and Politics with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities, 3d ed. (St. Louis: F.H. Thomas
& Company, 1880). Talmudic discussion of legal hermeneutics goes back at least 1800 years.
3 Ibid. at 52. A more contemporary definition is provided by Hans-Georg Gadamer "By
hermeneutics is understood the theory or art of explication, of interpretation." "Hermeneutics as
Practical Philosophy" in H.-G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, trans. F.G. Lawrence
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982) at 88. He would reject, however, any notion that it is a
"branch of science."
4 Ibid at 53.
5 See P.D. Carrington, "OfLaw and the River" (1984) 34 J. Leg. Ed. 222 and the correspondence
collected in "'Of Law and the River,' and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom" (1985) 35 J. Leg.
Ed. 1. I have recently assayed a response to Dean Carrington's article in S. Levinson, "Professing
Law: Commitment of Faith or Detached Analysis?" (1986) 31 St. Louis U.L. Rev. 3.
6 In R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth Co., 1979) 81, reprinting an
article from (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057.
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each side in the dispute can bring cogent arguments to bear. The legal
realist, or nihilist, often uses such cases to exemplify both the indeterminacy
of legal argument and the extent to which adjudication becomes the
imposition by a judge of his or her favorite public policy. Others,
uncomfortable with the radical implications of the indeterminacy thesis,
may instead use hard cases as occasions to exemplify that mysterious
quality called 'craft', whereby a John Marshall Harlan or Henry Friendly
(to name two especially notable American judges) can distill from
extraordinarily complex material the 'correct' legal solution.7 Both realists
and their critics, however, agree that well-trained lawyers can participate
on both sides of the issue. Dworkin, for one, has certainly never suggested
that the lawyers on either side of a hard case behave improperly. Indeed,
partisans of the adversary system regard such participation and the
vigorous presentation of conflicting arguments as essential so that all
of the subtle nuances can be presented to the judge. But do we (and
should we) focus, whether as jurisprudes or as lawyers, on hard cases
alone? Frederick Schauer, for example, argues that the emphasis
on the hard case distorts an adequate understanding of the law.8 Thus,
he asserts the importance of becoming more aware of the ubiquity of
'easy cases' in the practice of law, in which disputation (almost) never
occurs because every competent lawyer does indeed know the answer
to a given question. Schauer makes his argument as part of a more
general examination of the role of language in constraining legal
possibility. He therefore focuses on such patches of American consti-
tutional text as those requiring that public officials be of certain age,
that election and inauguration days occur at specific times, and the like.
It is, he correctly argues, not a hard case to decide when a newly elected
American President takes the oath of office or how many houses of
Congress there are. He thus criticizes neo-realists, like myself, for evading
recognition of the millions of easy cases in favour of focusing on the
relatively few hard cases.
Schauer's essay, in turn, is part of an important debate about the
character of what might be described as 'legal knowledge' 9 - a topic
with both jurisprudential and educational ramifications. At the jurispru-
dential level, the question is whether there are 'legal facts of the matter'
requiring that one must recognize a certain statement as being an
indubitably correct statement of the law rather than either a (genuinely)
7 See, ag., J.T. Sneed, "The Art of Statutory Interpretation" (1983) 62 Texas L. Rev. 665
for a recent articulation, by a sitting federal judge, of devotion to craft.
8 See F. Schauer, "Easy Cases" (1985) 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399.
9 See my reply to Schauer, S. Levinson, "What do Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do
With Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore" (1985) 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 441.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
debatable opinion or a prediction, la Holmes, that most adjudicators
would in fact adopt the statement at this particular time though there
are logically possible alternatives. At the educational level, the question
is whether or not students genuinely become more 'knowledgeable' in
the course of legal education. Do they become, to use an old-fashioned
phrase, genuinely 'learned in the law'?' 0 Or, on the contrary, do they
simply become more skilled in the use of what Plato denounced 2500
years ago as mere techniques of oratory - of rhetoric - that help one
in persuading an audience of the validity of any given proposition?
Most of us have little trouble, at least at the level of everyday speech,
in believing that in the course of their educations doctors become
knowledgeable about medicine or that engineers become knowledgeable
about the physics of bridge building. Do law students learn (and
experienced lawyers know) similar 'truths' of their discipline? Hard cases,
by definition, are scarcely a good test of the existence of legal knowledge
any more than focusing on the lack of knowledge about the etiology
of or potential cure for AIDS would genuinely establish the lack of reliable
medical knowledge. Indeed, the very recognition of a case as 'hard',
one may argue, requires the concomitant recognition of other cases as
'easy'. In the absence of such an opposition, we would only have cases
of equal difficulty. Picturing the distribution of case types is surely central
to one's overall portrait of the legal system and of 'thinking like a lawyer'.
How is it to be done?
Allan Hutchinson and John Wakefield strongly argue that Dworkin
makes only "a series of casual and generalized remarks about the possible
identity of a 'hard case'."" One of the attributes cited is the ability of
"reasonable lawyers [to] disagree about rights."12 Dworkin does indeed
contrast hard and easy cases. The hard case generates a self-consciously
'principled' decision by the judge, who makes reference both to rules
and to general principles of the legal order. In contrast, the easy case
can be resolved through syllogistic analysis. "[T]he entire argument of
the court's opinion [can be cast] in the form of one or more syllogisms."'13
As Hutchinson and Wakefield note, this does not explain how one
recognizes such cases but only indicates what follows from such a
10 See C. Fried, "The Artificial Reason of the Law Or What Lawyers Know" (1981) 60
Texas L. Rev. 35 for an argument that lawyers do indeed become learned in law.
11 See A.C. Hutchinson & J.N. Wakefield, "A Hard Look at 'Hard Cases': The Nightmare
of a Noble Dreamer" (1982) 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 86 at 91.
12 Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 6 at xiv. See also ibid. at 81: "[R]easonable lawyers
and judges will often disagree about legal rights."
13 Hutchinson & Wakefield, supra, note 11 at 91 (quoting R. Dworkin, "Judicial Discretion"
(1963) 60 J. Phil. 623 at 625-26).
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recognition. Indeed, they conclude that "on Dworkin's own terms, every
case adjudicated upon must be treated as a 'hard case', if such a
phenomenon is characterized by the use of principled reasoning by the
judge."14
One obvious problem identified by Hutchinson and Wakefield is
the haziness, if not disappearance, of Dworkin's own distinction between
hard and easy cases. Yet some theorists insist on the phenomenological
reality of 'easy' cases. Thus Fred Schauer appeals to our experience as
lawyers that we do not have equal difficulty in assessing all cases presented
to us, whatever the nature of our abstract jurisprudential ideas. No doubt
he is right. It is imposible to challenge the accuracy of such phenome-
nological reports given that most of us have on occasion dismissed one
or another legal argument as absurd and simply unworthy of serious
attention.' 5
The phenomenon of 'easiness' is not in question. 16 What is in doubt,
however, is what explains our perception of certain cases as easy. In
particular, can any formal criteria be offered, or are we ultimately left
to decidedly informal norms such as 'the sense of the community' or
the intuitions of what Henry Hart referred to as "first-rate lawyers"? 17
14 Hutchinson & Wakefield, ibid. at 107 (emphasis in original). Dworkin has recently responded
that Hutchinson and Wakefield have created "a pseudoproblem." R. Dworkin, Law's Empire
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986) at 354. There is not, he says, "one method for hard
cases and another for easy ones." An analyst will use the same method for both, but the obviousness
of the answers to easy cases leaves us
[un]aware that any theory is at work at all. We think the question whether someone may
legally drive faster than the stipulated speed limit is an easy one because we assume at
once that no account of the legal record that denied that paradigm would be competent.
But someone whose convictions about justice and fairness were very different from ours
might not find that question so easy: even if he ended by agreeing with our answer, he
would insist that we were wrong to be so confident.
Ibid. The question at this point presumably involves the basis by which we take a different set
of "convictions about justice and fairness" seriously enough to give it a respectful hearing (and
answer) that requires on our own part a recognition that strong confidence in our own views might
be misplaced.
15 Such dismissals have occurred not only in the abstract, as in discussions with colleagues,
but also in the concrete reality of grading final examinations, when certain arguments seem so
devoid of acceptable models of legal analysis as to warrant failure.
16 We should not assume that a case is easy only if it is indubitable that it could not go
the other way. The Cartesian view that we have knowledge only if we have indubitable
knowledge is not persuasive and in any case will not sustain any invidious comparison
between, say, law and physics.... One could, of course, bite the bullet and defend skepticism
about law on the ground of general skepticism: that we know nothing at all. That is a
venerable philosophical position though one which is easier to state than to accept. But
in any case general skepticism deprives legal skepticism of its political punch. Lawyers
pretend to knowledge they lack, but then so does everyone else, including those who make
that claim.
Letter from Leslie Green to Sanford Levinson (10 April 1986). 1 am extremely grateful for Professor
Green's comments on the draft initially presented at Osgoode Hall Law School.
17 See P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) at 53.
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One practical problem with Schauer's argument is that it seems to
rest ultimately on unlitigated or unasserted cases, cases that are truly
never pursued because they are so easy. One way of reading his argument
is that any case that is brought is by that very fact an 'uneasy' case.
He can thus be read as substantially accepting much of the realist argument
in regard to litigated cases, while at the same time chastising realists
for failing to recognize that cases constitute only a fraction of the legal
world. We should, he says, think of a law office conversation where
a lawyer discourages the bringing of a case because it is, alas, an easy
case that cuts against the client. In such conversations, according to
Schauer's view, the true professionalism of the lawyer asserts itself, for
it consists precisely in the ability of the educated lawyer to inform the
lay client that 'the law' simply does not support his or her hopes. Lawyers
may not know much in the way of hard-and-fast knowledge, but they
can at least recognize the truly easy case.' 8
Ill. FROM EASINESS TO FRIVOLOUSNESS
Both hard and easy cases are inhabitants of what might be called
a jurisprude's universe. There is, however, a linked concept that inhabits
not only the conceptual universe of the jurisprude but also the more
mundane (and socially important) universe of the practicing lawyer, both
in the United States and in Canada. This is the 'frivolous case'.' 9 In
theory, at least, a lawyer is not permitted to bring just any lawsuit for
which a client is willing to pay the bill. According to the recently revised
Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
The signature of an attorney ... constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.... (Emphasis added)
18 Schauer, supra, note 8 at 421.
19 Professor Green has suggested that 'easy' and 'frivolous' cases are not so linked as I maintain.
He views the hard-easy dichotomy (or continuum) as raising questions about cognition.
In an easy case, propositions of law are bivalent, they are either true or false; in a hard
case they may be neither true nor false but indeterminate. The frivolity of a case, on the
other hand, is a function of the value of putting it. A case is frivolous only if the value
of its being heard is not worth the costs (in a large rather than narrow or economic sense).
Now this is an evaluative classification. Some frivolous cases are easy, some are hard.
Letter from Leslie Green, supra, note 16.
I agree that this distinction is possible, but I think that it misses the most plausible purpose
of the prohibitions against frivolous litigation discussed in the text. Insofar as we accept a modernist
notion of subjective value, I think that we are willing to tolerate a litigant's bringing a case that
most of us would find radically 'uneconomic', so long as the formal legal arguments are not
preposterous. After all, some individuals might have an exaggerated sense of honour that requires
them to sue for defamation or invasion of privacy when the rest of us would shrug our shoulders.
A lay person might call such a suit frivolous, but I do not think that a trained lawyer would.
(Some, of course, would use this as an example of the professional deformation of legal 'training'.)
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Sanctions for breach of Rule 11 include the award of costs and attorneys
fees to the other side. Similarly, Rule 38 of the U.S. Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides that "[i]f a court of appeals shall determine
that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee." Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of
the United States also has a rule permitting the award of damages "[w]hen
an appeal or petition for writ of certiorari is frivolous." 20 Though my
examples are taken from federal law, at least twenty states have enacted
statutes authorizing sanctions for the bringing of frivolous claims.21
The language of Rule 11 simply tracks that of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, which ostensibly prohibits a lawyer from
"[k]nowingly advanc[ing] a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it
can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law."22 This rule was recently modified by the
American Bar Association (ABA) when it submitted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct to the states for their consideration. The new
rule states, "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law." 23 A note attached to this new
rule indicates that it is intended to generate an objective test, so that
mere subjective belief in the plausibility of one's argument is not enough
to escape censure.24 A Canadian analogue to these American examples
is the Ontario Barrister's Oath, which requires the vow that the barrister
will not, among other things, "promote suits upon frivolous pretences." 25
As part, perhaps, of the general concern expressed these days about
the purported litigation overload of the judicial system, judges in the
United States seem increasingly interested in enforcing Rules 11 and
38. Further, awards of costs or attorneys' fees cannot always be passed
20 Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 49.2.
21 See J.M. Johnson & G.E. Cassady HI, "Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to
Them - What Relief is Available?" (1985) 36 Ala. L. Rev. 927 at 958-60. See also J.A. Parness,
"Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts" (1985) Utah L. Rev. 325;
H.D. Dubosar & UJ. Perez, Jr., "Ask Questions First and Shoot Later Constraining Frivolity in
Litigation Under Rule II' (1986) 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 1267.
22 American Bar Association, Model Code of Profesional Responsibility [hereinafter CPR] DR
7-102(A)(2) (1980).
23 American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.1 (1983).
24 See "Model Code Comparison" of 3.1 with DR 7-102(AX1), ibid.
25 The Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 19, Rule 51, quoted in M. Gold, "The Court's Authority
to Award Costs Against Lawyers" in E. Gertner, ed., Studies in Civil Procedure (Toronto: Butterworths,
1979) at 62 n.12. I assume that this oath is not unique to Ontario.
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on to the client. As the Seventh Circuit put it in a recent case, the pressing
forward of a frivolous appeal, "though attributable to the appellant, is
in fact more a reflection of the incompetence or obstinacy of the appellant's
attorney."26 The panel therefore assessed the penalty directly against the
attorney as a means of deterring such conduct and, presumably, encour-
aging greater competence.2 7 Moreover, the very ethic of professionalism,
if it is taken seriously, requires that lawyers pay the costs, for by definition
the client cannot be expected to be able to monitor the lawyer's decision
as to what passes beyond the line of permitted implausibility into the
arena of prohibited frivolity.
Indeed, a recent article in the National Law Journal noted that
attorney sanctions have been imposed upon some of the leading law
firms in the United States, including Cravath, Swaine & Moore of New
York and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, the Los Angeles firm to which
former Attorney General William French Smith belongs. As the Journal
put it, "[A]ttenuated arguments, made in a why-not-try-it spirit, now
can cost the lawyer fees incurred defending against them - a price
courts often order the attorney himself to pay and not pass on to the
client."2 8
26 Maneikis v. Jordan (1982), 678 F.2d 720 at 722. See also Thornton v. Wahl (1986), 787
F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.), where the Court, after awarding costs and attorneys fees "on its own initiative"
at 1153, labeled the appellant's arguments as "preposterous" and "a serious misstatement of state
law" at 1154 and specifically allocated the burden of its award of fees:
Ordinarily we impose attorneys' fees on the party, leaving party and lawyer to settle accounts.
But we do not suppose that the representations about state law were approved by Mrs.
Thornton personally; although she is responsible for pursuing this litigation, she has received
bad legal advice. We therefore impose [half] of the award on counsel personally.
Ibid In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. (1984), 103 F.R.D. 124 at 129 (N.D.
Cal.), the court specifically ruled that "[s]anctions shall be paid by the firm of Kirkland & Ellis
and shall not be reimbursed by the defendant. In addition, both Kirkland & Ellis [and local counsel]
shall submit a statement certifying that a copy of this opinion was given to each partner and
associate of each firm."
See also Jorgensen v. County of Volusia (1986), 625 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla.) (lawyer fined
$500 for failing to cite controlling cases in a motion for a temporary restraining order).
27 Indeed, I have been informed by a colleague of his having witnessed, during his tenure
as a law clerk for a federal district judge, several lawyers pleading not be to sanctioned under
Rule 11 because companies holding their malpractice insurance require Rule 11 sanctions to be
reported.
28 Strasser, "Sanctions: A Sword Is Sharpened" (I 1 November 1985) Nat. LJ. I. See also
S.S. Partridge, J.C. Wilkinson & AJ. Krouse, "A Complaint Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous
Litigation" (1985) 31 Loyola L. Rev. 221 at 241, n.114 for a citation of a number of recent
cases imposing sanctions. Though not concerning sanctions imposed against lawyers, a recent decision
by the Washington State Supreme Court may nonetheless interest professorial readers of this article.
The Court upheld an award of $50,000 of legal fees imposed on a University of Washington
chemistry professor for filing a "frivolous" lawsuit against the university regarding alleged
mistreatment by his department. The Supreme Court described the professors involved as "bickering
adults" and said that "the courts are an inappropriate forum in which to settle a personal squabble
among professional colleagues." The professor against whom the fee was assessed makes $28,000
a year. Describing himself as "absolutely stunned" by the decision, he says that he may have to
declare bankruptcy. The award of fees was opposed by the American Association of University
Professors and the American Civil Liberties Union. See S. Heller, "Professor Is Told to Pay $50,000
for 'Frivolous' Lawsuit" (28 May 1986) Chronicle of Higher Educ. I at 22.
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One judge, who has written an article specifically encouraging his
fellow jurists to be more active monitors of argumentative propriety under
Rule 11,29 fined the Chicago firm of Kirkland & Ellis $3155 in attorneys
fees for filing a motion for summary judgment that "presented an argument
calculated to lead the Court to believe that it was 'warranted by existing
law' rather than 'a good faith argument for the extension... of existing
law'."30 This part of Judge Schwarzer's opinion involved an argument
concerning Minnesota law. In addition, in an argument concerning
California law, the brief cited only a 1965 California case and did not
mention a 1979 case pointing in the opposite direction. Kirkland & Ellis
made what Judge Schwarzer conceded was the "technically correct" 31
claim that the 1965 case had not been specifically overruled, but he
awarded damages nonetheless. According to Robert J. Kopecky of the
firm, "[t]hat's what makes this controversial and concerns a lot of lawyers.
In our view, it runs contrary to the nature of advocacy not to state as
forcefully as possible a case consistent with the law."32 A brief submitted
by the firm to the Ninth Circuit warned that allowance of the sanctions
would "produce a more subservient, more cautious, even a more timid
bar" and "change basic notions of advocacy rooted in the classical and
common law legal traditions."33
Because of my background, I am of course knowledgeable primarily
about American law. However, to use the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure
as an example of Canadian law, imposition of costs upon a solicitor
is permissible "[w]here a solicitor for a party has caused costs to be
incurred without reasonable cause."34 Apparently few cases are directly
on point, but one of them, United Van Lines (Canada) Ltd v. Petrov,35
seems to have involved a frivolous position. Use of a particular legal
29 W. Schwarzer, "Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look" (1985)
104 F.R.D. 181. Judge Schwarzer was described in Strasser's article, supra, note 28 at I as "a
leading judicial activist on the sanctions front." Not all judges are so enthusiastic as Judge Schwarzer
about the merits of Rule 11. Thus Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the U.S. District Court in
Brooklyn has severely criticized Rule 11 for "increas[ing] the tensions in litigation, and ... the
amount of extra motions and extra appeals. To date, the effects have been adverse." T. Lewin,
"A Legal Curb Raises Hackles" New York Tunes (2 October 1986) DI at D8. See also M.L.
Nelken, "Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some 'Chilling' Problems in the Struggle
Between Compensation and Punishment" (1986) 74 Geo. L. Rev. 1313.
30 Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., supra, note 26 at 126.
31 Ibi. at 129.
32 Strasser, supra, note 28 at 32.
33 Ibid The Ninth Cicuit has recently reversed the trial decision. (1986) 801 F. 2d 1531.
34 Rules of Civil Procedure, 0. Reg 560/84. 0. Reg. 786/84, Rule 57.07.
35 (1975), 13 O.R.(2d) 479, 1 C.P.C. 307 (Co. Ct.).
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procedure was "a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is
a solicitor's duty to ascertain with accuracy."
36
Professor Gold makes the important point that a lawyer is viewed
as an officer of the court,37 and he suggests "that it may be part of
a solicitor's duty to the court that he only raise points which are fairly
arguable. To take a thoroughly bad and unmeritorious point which results
in extra costs to the parties may justify a costs order against a solicitor."38
In any event, the presence of 'frivolousness' as a legal concept makes
it possible to test the proposition that the legal system generates truly
easy, as well as hard, cases. One of my aims is, therefore, to begin an
inquiry into the enforcement of the prohibition against frivolousness in
the law.39 Can such an examination help us in our more basic juris-
prudential deliberations, with their focus on 'hard' and 'easy' cases? I
should make clear that I am focusing on only one aspect of the 'frivolous
case' problem, that is, the aspect dealing with legal arguments. The other
aspect, which appears to account for the majority of actual cases, involves
factual frivolousness, where claims are asserted without sufficient in-
vestigation into the actual existence of the underlying facts that concededly
would be necessary in order to support a claim.
40
IV. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAWYERING
I have two reasons for being interested in frivolous cases. One, as
has already been explained, is the connection with traditional jurispru-
dential inquiry. But the second reason involves a rather explicit rejection
of the conventional Anglo-American jurisprudential infatuation with the
thought processes of judges. I have referred elsewhere to our traditional
36 Ibid O.R. at 487, quoting from Myers v. Eman (1939), [1940] A.C. 282, [1939] 4 All
E.R. 481 (H.L.).
37 Gold, supra, note 25 at 72-73, discussing Myers v. Elman, ibid
38 bid at 79. I gather that lawyers in Ontario have expressed some concern that Rule 57.07
might be used by the courts to tax attorneys should they make losing arguments of particular
novelty or controversy.
39 A linked subject, of course, is the tort of malicious prosecution, which under certain
circumstances allows a successful defendant to sue the plaintiff for having brought the suit. These
circumstances include, in addition to a lack of probable cause for the underlying suit, the successful
termination of the suit in the defendant's favour and, perhaps most importantly, malice on the
part of the original plaintiff. See Note, "Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate:
A Historical Analysis" (1979) 88 Yale LJ. 1218 at 1219. See also J.K. Jones, Jr., "Liability for
Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation" (1980) 33 Vand. L. Rev. 743; L.A. Pizzimenti, "A Lawyer's
Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation" (1980) 26 Wayne L. Rev. 1561. I am not concerned in
this essay with the technicalities of malicious prosecution, however, primarily because of the malice
requirement, which necessarily includes subjective examination of the motivation of the plaintiff.
I am much more concerned with the objective legal knowledge that can be expected of an attorney.
40 See, e-g., Partridge, Wilkinson & Krouse, supra, note 28, which focuses on "complaint[s]
based on rumors."
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jurisprudence as generating a model of "law without lawyers,"41 but I
think that we very much need to integrate lawyers into our operating
conceptions of law.
The traditional emphasis on judges is most notably seen in our own
time in the work of Ronald Dworkin, with his model judge, Hercules,
whose task it is to search for right answers to legal questions. Although
I have written critically of Dworkin, I have always been willing to concede
a measure of plausibility to his phenomenological description of the task
of judging.42 Whether we are judging law or interpreting a poem, it seems
psychologically accurate to say that our obligation is to present our
audience with the best interpretation of which we are capable. To do
anything else is to dissemble, perhaps even to lie. We are free, of course,
to say that we find more than one interpretation equally good. What
we cannot do, however, if we are to retain our integrity either as judges
or as scholars, is to present a public argument that we privately believe
to be weaker than an alternative.
Much of the swirl of argument surrounding Dworkin has either
involved the plausibility of searching for unique solutions to complex
legal problems or the defining of the particular relationship between what
he calls 'principles' and 'goals'. There have been few attacks on the
phenomenological model just described. It should be absolutely clear,
though, that Dworkin's model of law cannot possibly explain the ordinary
reality of the practicing lawyer. The academic emphasis on judges has
generated an understanding of law that ill accords with what lawyers
actually do or how they actually think. Although I shall elaborate this
point below, for now let it suffice to state that it is not an essential
part of a lawyer's role to actually believe the argument being asserted.
Lawyers are fully licensed to present arguments to judges - including
Herculean judges - that they do not believe and that, indeed, they would
quickly reject were they in the judge's place.
Failure to take account of whether we are describing judge's law
or lawyer's law has had important implications in our jurisprudential
history. For example, Justice Holmes's predictive theory of law makes
perfectly good sense once one realizes that Holmes was not talking to
judges about their law but rather to law students - future lawyers -
about theirs.43 He grasped, as few have before or since, that lawyers
and judges live remarkably different lives as servants of the law.
41 Levinson, supra, note 9 at 454.
42 See S. Levinson, Book Review (1978) 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1071 at 1104-6.
43 O.w. Holmes, "The Path of the Law" in Collected Legal Papers 173 (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1920). This theory was subjected to withering criticism by Professor H.L.A. Hart in The
Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
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I have already alluded to what I consider to be one of the central
realities of the lawyer's life - the legitimacy of disbelief in one's public
utterances. This legitimacy is spelled out with perfect clarity in the codes
of so-called legal ethics within the United States. Thus the American
Bar Association in its Model Code of Professional Responsibility specifies
that "[t]he advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to
the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail."44 Further,
the Code immediately goes on to validate the representation of a client
by a lawyer "even though [the] client has elected to pursue a course
of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer."45 Now it is true that
both quotations are incomplete as stated. The first limits the advocate
to arguing a position "supported by the law or ... supportable by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the
law. However, a lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation
that is frivolous." 46 The latter equally rejects representation of the advice-
rejecting client when it would require the lawyer "to take a frivolous
legal position."47
Nonetheless, both the established standards and the actual conven-
tions of legal practice give the advocate permission to make weak but
non-frivolous arguments. The tolerance of vigorous advocacy on both
sides of a hard case is extended to cases that, at least from an orthodox
jurisprudential perspective, scarcely warrant that appellation. Here the
advocate's task is indeed similar to that of the orator in ancient Greece,
to make what is felt to be the lesser argument appear the greater. A
skilled lawyer-orator can presumably lead a non-Herculean judge to adopt
a misreading of the law that, through the very issuance of the resulting
opinion, may become the law.
What I have discussed up to now presupposes that these arguments
will take place within the context of litigation, which assures at least
some public exposure. The organized American Bar, however, is equally
tolerant of disbelief even in non-litigation contexts. Perhaps the most
important example involves advice given to clients preparing tax returns,
who must decide, for example, whether to report certain transactions
as income or whether to take certain deductions.
44 CPR, supra, note 22, EC 7-4. The "Comment" accompanying Rule 3.1 recently adopted
by the American Bar Association as part of its new Model Rules of Profesional Conduct specifically
ratifies this understanding of the lawyer's role: "[An] action is not frivolous even though the lawyer
believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail."
45 CPR, ibid EC 7-5.
46 Ibid., EC 7-4.
47 IMi, EC 7-5.
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The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility only
this past July issued an opinion specifically treating the legitimacy of
a lawyer's advice to a client regarding the position to take on a tax
return. The Committee adopted the standard already quoted: It allows
a lawyer to advise "positions most favorable to the client if the lawyer
has a good faith belief that those positions are warranted in existing
law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."48 The Committee takes note
of the fact that "good faith belief' can co-exist with a belief that "the
client's position probably will not prevail. However, good faith requires
that there be some realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated."49
The ABA does not indicate whether 50-1 counts as a "realistic pos-
sibility."50 (After all, long shots do occasionally come in. I need not tell
a Toronto audience what the odds were of Kansas City coming back
in the 1985 playoffs and subsequent World Series.)
Lest one believe that "realistic possibility" requires, for example,
the lawyer to be able to cite at least some case law or similarly authoritative
material favorable to an argument, the Committee states that good faith
can be present even where "there is no 'substantial authority' in support
of the position."51 The Opinion does state that lawyers should advise
their clients that positions unsupported by substantial authority can
potentially lead to a significant penalty imposed by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), a penalty that can be avoided if the tax return includes
adequate disclosure of the controversial "facts in the return or in a
statement attached to the return."52 However, the Opinion leaves the
decision whether to include such a disclosure to the client, who can
"decide to risk the penalty by making no disclosure and to take the
48 ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 85-352
[hereinafter Opinion] (15 July 1985), (1985) 71 ABA J. 151.
49 Ibid at 151-53.
50 Does it matter, in assessing a lawyer's conduct, whether the lawyer (or the assessor) believes
that, as a matter of public policy independent of the interests of the particular client, his or her
particular construction of the Code is a desirable one, even if benighted judges are unlikely to
accept it? Or is the only relevant interest that can be taken into account by the lawyer (or the
assessor) that of the client?
51 Opinion, supra, note 48 at 153. 26 USC §6702 states that a taxpayer who takes "a position
which is frivolous ... shall pay a penalty of $500." 26 USC §6673 authorizes the Tax Court
to assess damages of up to $5000 against a taxpayer who litigates in behalf of a position that
"is frivolous or groundless."
52 26 USC §6661(b)(2)(BXii).
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position initially advised by the lawyer in accordance with the standard
stated above."53
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this example is that no
realistic expectation exists that the position taken will in fact ever become
part of a litigation process and thus be tested by any kind of public
examination. Every American tax lawyer is familiar with the so-called
tax lottery, based on the remarkably low percentage of returns actually
audited within the United States. "This has led," say Professors Wolfman
and Holden, "to an 'audit lottery' in which taxpayers who adopt aggressive
(doubtful, albeit reasonable) positions rely for success not so much on
their conviction that they will be able to prevail on the merits if challenged
as on their firm knowledge that they have a 98% chance of never being
challenged."54
Tax advice may present a particularly dramatic kind of problem.
No one knows how much of the American deficit could be cut if people
were restrained by their lawyers from taking positions where the chance
of prevailing was worse than one in four. One suspects, though, that
a substantial number of the hungry and the homeless, whose pittances
are being cut in order to reduce the deficit, could be fed and housed
out of the money that would flow to the government under this
counterfactual supposition. But there is surely nothing unique about tax
law in terms of the basic problem under discussion, that is, the implications
for a legal system of allowing lawyers to counsel their clients by reference
to good faith readings of the law.
As many persons have pointed out, usually in criticism of our focus
as legal academics on appellate case law, most legal events are in fact
never litigated. Clients and their lawyers most often conclude their
interactions in law offices rather than in courtrooms. The advice lawyers
feel free to give their clients has far more to do with structuring our
legal system than does the legal opining of judges in specific cases. This
is true whether we are referring, for example, to the kinds of contracts
lawyers write for their clients or the kinds of labour policies adopted
by companies on advice of counsel. At most a lawyer is bound only
53 Opinion, supra, note 48 at 153. See C. Johnson, "Tax Return Positions in Contempt of
Civil Penalties" (6 November 1986) 33 Tax Notes 501, for a vigourous attack on the A.B.A.
opinion and a defense of a more restrictive Proposed Treasury Regulation.
54 B. Wolfnan & J. Holden, Ethical Problems in Federal Tax Practice, 2d ed. (Charlottesville,
Va.: Michie Co., 1985) at 59. See generally, ibid at 55-64, 70-75 for materials relevant to a
discussion of this issue. The percentage of audited returns has gone down since the quoted article.
See, ag., A. Peers, "Tax Roundup: What Triggers an Audit.. ." (11 April 1986) Wall Street Journal
25: "The IRS audited 1.3% of the 96.5 million individual tax returns filed in the year ended September
30 [1985] up from 1.27% a year earlier."
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to predict to the client the possible consequences of litigation: no one
is seriously obligated to structure her or his behaviour on the basis of
such predictions.
Indeed, a remarkable aspect of American legal practice exists where
even almost completely predictable judicial consequences are flouted with
apparent impunity. I am referring to what is euphemistically called
'nonacquiescence' by federal agencies in the interpretation of statute law
by courts.55 Agencies such as the IRS, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) have on occasion
refused to accept as guiding precedents the decisions of United States
Courts of Appeals, even within the Circuit affected by a particular
decision.5 6 The position of these agencies appears to be that only the
United States Supreme Court can issue an authoritative interpretation
of the law and a lower court decision is merely suggestive; therefore
the United States is not 'collaterally estopped' from relitigating questions
that have already been decided.
The IRS has formally issued Revenue Rulings indicating nonacquies-
cence to the particular doctrine enunciated in a decision of the Tax Court,
thus indicating that no precedential effect would be accorded to the
decision5 7 A similar procedure has apparently been used in regard to
decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals.58 The SSA also has
on occasion issued specific rulings indicating non-acquiescence in court
decisions.5 9
The NLRB is less formal, though it has sometimes criticized
administrative Trial Examiners for following "certain decisions of U.S.
Courts of Appeals which expressed views contrary to those of the Board,
and which the Board has not accepted." 60 Such rejection of judicial
55 See S.P. Eichel, "Respectful Disagreement: Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies in United States Court of Appeals Precedents" (1985) 18 Col. J.L. Soc. Prob. 463; W.W.
Buzbee, "Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence" (1985) 85 Colum. L. Rev. 582;
Note, "Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuit
of Litigant Equality" (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 847. See also D. Maranville, "Nonacquiescence:
Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism" (1986) 39 Vand. L. Rev. 471.
56 It has long been an accepted part of American jurisprudence that one circuit court cannot
bind another.
57 See Modricker, et aL "104-6thT.M., IRS National Office Procedures - Rulings, Closing
Agreements A-20-21" (1983).
58 See Buzbee, supra, note 55 at 588-89: "Cases of intracircuit nonacquiescence, however,
appear to be an uncommon exception instead of a concerted policy, and the IRS may, in fact,
no longer practice intracircuit nonacquiescence."
59 Ibid at 585-86, n.26.
60 Iowa Beef Packers; Inc. v. NLRB (1963), 144 N.L.R.B. 615 at 616, enforced in part, (1964)
331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir.). See generally Eichel, supra, note 55 at 470 and notes 45-46, supra.
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authority has been met, as one might expect, with vigorous opposition
from the courts themselves. Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has written, "For the Board to predicate an order on its disagreement
with this court's interpretation of a statute is for it to operate outside
the law."6 1 The Second Circuit similarly described the NLRB practice
as "intolerable if the rule of law is to prevail."62
In recent years the most important example of non-acquiescence
has involved the SSA, which insisted on relitigating non-eligibility
determinations made under procedures declared illegal by courts. Al-
though it may be true that "victory is a foregone conclusion for each
citizen who directly challenges an agency on the basis of settled circuit
precedent," 63 many of the disappointed claimants are either unaware of
the illegality of the procedures or unable to afford lawyers who can
litigate even this open-and-shut case. Reports have been published, though,
of at least some United States attorneys who have refused to represent
the SSA in court because the Adminstration's position is without a basis
in law.64 A Ninth Circuit judge equated this non-acquiescence policy
of the Reagan Administration as a denial of the principle of judicial
supremacy similar to that found in the Old South doctrine of nullification. 65
It is for these reasons, among others, that I have argued that the
central source of so-called legal nihilism, a topic much written about
these days, is the behaviour (and supporting ideology) of the practicing
bar. For it is there - and not merely in the abstract writings of legal
academics - that one will discover the genuinely important emphasis
on the inherent indeterminacies within the law and the concomitant ability
to distinguish practically any case or construe practically any statute
in a way that will count at least as a "good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law."66
It should be easily apparent that the model of lawyering I am
presenting is radically different from Schauer's. The important point is,
however, that both of us may well be correct. That is, I am willing
to concede that millions of potential lawsuits might never take place
61 Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB (1979), 608 F.2d 965 at 970 (3d Cir.).
62 Ithaca College v. NLRB (1980), 623 F.2d 224 at 228 (2d Cir.). The Court emphasized
that, "When [the Board] disagrees in a particular case, it should seek review in the Supreme Court."
Ibid
63 Buzbee, supra, note 55 at 602-3.
64 See ibid at 609, n.174.
65 Lopez v. Heckler (1983), 713 F.2d 1432 at 1441 (9th Cir.) (Pregerson I., concurring).
66 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11.
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because lawyers in fact recognize certain cases as easy and successfully
dissuade their clients from pressing forward with litigation. In addition,
though I am asserting that additional millions of legal encounters occur
in which lawyers assure their clients that given positions are 'tenable'
even if likely losers, or, as in the case of non-acquiescence, federal agencies
successfully order their lawyers to disregard what the naive might regard
as binding precedent. I also suspect that flamboyance in the interpretation67
of legal materials is a direct function of the perceived odds against
litigation. This simply repeats the observation of Holmes and the realists
made over a half-century ago that the relationship between law on the
books and the law in action is extremely tenuous. What remains all
too true, though, even after half a century, is that the empirical research
that might provide some greater clarity about the actual behaviour of
lawyers is sadly lacking.
V. CONTROLLING FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENT
Still, we do know that the law on the books says that lawyers, though
allowed to make weak arguments, have no right to present frivolous
ones. It is time, then, to turn more explicitly to what 'good faith' might
entail, especially once we move beyond reliance on callow subjectivity,
where a lawyer can purchase immunity simply by demonstrating his or
her own sincerity of belief in an otherwise preposterous argument. Two
problems will particularly concern us: First, does the standard provide
genuine knowledge to a lawyer seeking guidelines as to what arguments
can be presented on behalf of a client? Second, and related, is this new
interest in preventing ostensibly frivolous litigation in fact part of a
conservative reaction against imagination in general? Is it a subtle attempt
to deter lawyers, in the language of the Benchers of the Law Society
of Upper Canada,
from bringing to trial causes of action or defences that are novel, controversial
or difficult because of the risk that the lawyer could be called upon to pay the
costs personally if the action or the defence fails. If such should be the result
of the rule, the members of the public could be denied their right to legal
representation at a time when it is needed most, and the natural development
of the law would suffer.
68
This paper is concerned with the first question more than the second,
but everyone should be aware of the political concerns that hover over
this issue.
67 That is, the willingness to deviate substantially from the generally accepted conventions
of legal argumentation.
68 Law Society of Upper Canada, "Communiqu" No. 156 (1 August 1985).
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In a recent United States Supreme Court case, Justice Brennan,joined
by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented from a decision awarding
$500 damages against a violator of the Supreme Court rule prohibiting
frivolous appeals or petitions for certiorari. Justice Brennan objected that
the Rule "sets no standards for determining when a petition for certiorari
is 'frivolous'." 69 These Justices seem to suggest that the prohibition of
frivolous litigation, without further elaboration, violates the general norm
against vagueness in the law. One of the central interpretations of due
process of law is that the State must provide "fair notice" of what it
"commands or forbids." 70 It is, I suspect, no coincidence that writers
on frivolousness have tended to adopt versions of Justice Stewart's famous
(or is the correct word 'notorious'?) test of pornography, that is, "[P]erhaps
I could never succeed in intelligently [defining it] ... [b]ut I know it
when I see it."71 Thus a writer notes that "[f]rivolousness, like madness
and obscenity is more readily recognized than cogently defined." 72 I
suspect that Justice Brennan would be tempted to adopt Justice Black's
comment about the deficiencies of attempted regulation of obscenity:
"[N]o person, not even the most learned judge.., is capable of knowing
in advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by this Court
whether certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity'." 73 Substitute
'argument' for 'material' and 'frivolousness' for 'obscenity', and the heart
of the critique of the rules mentioned earlier is made manifest.
Consider, for example, several reported cases or arguments in regard
to deciding what counts as frivolity in the law. My favorite is a Texas
case in which an oil company argued that a statutory requirement of
a bid for an oil lease was that the royalty offer be written as a percentage.
74
The company therefore argued that its competitor, who had offered a
royalty of .82165 had not complied with the statute, which purportedly
69 Hyde v. Van Wormer (1985), 106 S.Ct. 403 at 404. See also Tatum v. Regents of University
of Nebraska (1984), 462 U.S. 1117, where damages were also awarded over the objection of the
same three Justices. In Gullo v. McGill (1984), 462 U.S. 1101, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor indicated that they would have awarded damages.
70 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939), 306 U.S. 451 at 453; Connally v. General Construction
Co. (1926), 269 U.S. 385.
71 Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), 378 U.S. 184 at 197 (Stewart J., concurring).
72 R. Hermann, "Frivolous Criminal Appeals" (1972) 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 701 at 705, quoted
in D.A. Shaneyfelt, "Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious Litigants
and Over-Zealous Attorneys" (1984) 20 Williamette L. Rev. 441 at 446.
73 Quoted by Justice Brennan in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49 at 87.
74 Oil Gas Futures, Inc of Texas v. Andrus (1980), 610 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.).
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required an offer of 82.165 percent. The Fifth Circuit pronounced this
argument "quite incredible," 75 and its opinion quoted from some children's
arithmetic books on how to convert decimals into percentages and vice
versa. But the most notable point is that the district judge below had
apparently accepted this argument, and the Fifth Circuit had to reverse
him.
Or, at the level of constitutional argument, imagine a distinguished
former member of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit solemnly
telling the Supreme Court of the United States that municipal attempts
to limit the access of teenagers to electronic video games were a violation
of the rights established by the First Amendment protecting the game
designer's ability to communicate with his or her potential audience.76
(I suspect that every experienced legal practitioner or law professor could
regale us with war stories entirely on point. What he or she might not
be willing to do is to confess to his or her own most dubious arguments.)77
Those who take seriously the notion of frivolousness must, in the
absence of greater specification of formal standards, take with equal
seriousness the existence of a coherent legal community with shared
understandings of what counts as genuine legal argument. 78 Whether
such a community exists - and can impose what, borrowing from
Professor Hart, one might call "rules of recognition" as to what constitutes
plausible renderings of the law - is, of course, one of the important
issues raised by the contemporary debate about legal nihilism mentioned
earlier. Consider in this context one of my favorite quotations from the
75 Ibid at 288.
76 See Afladin's Castle Inc v. City of Mesquite (1980), 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.), rev'd in
part on other grounds, (1982), 455 U.S. 283. Yet here, too, the 'rhetorical force' of my example
is undercut by the fact that this argument has in fact been accepted by at least three courts, even
as it has been rejected by others. See the cases cited in Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton
(1983), 444 N.E.2d 922 at 926 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.) (rejecting First Amendment argument).
77 The examples immediately above, and the general topic of this essay, is the restraint placed
upon lawyers in presenting arguments. If one extends the search for frivolity to pro se cases, one
can find considerably more colourful examples. Thus George v. Texas (1986), 788 F.2d 1099 (5th
Cir.), concerns an alleged "right to sex" that would prohibit the vice squad of the Houston, Texas
police department from using policewomen to pose as prostitutes and then arresting men who
propositioned them. The court found George's appeal of a lower court dismissal of his claim to
be "patently frivolous" at 1100 and awarded the appellees double costs and attorney's fees under
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
78 Professor Schneyer in correspondence has suggested that "one may take frivolousness
seriously so long as one considers the existence of a legal speech community [as] something to
be wished for, something worth treating as if it were the case." Letter from Professor Schneyer
to Sanford Levinson (3 July 1986).
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legal literature, Professors Mishkin and Morris writing in 1965 on the
prospects for the adoption of comparative negligence by courts:
[I]t seems clear that there is no substantial likelihood that any court will act today,
as a matter of common law development, to substitute comparative negligence
for an existing rule of contributbry negligence in the general accident field. Indeed,
lawyers will not even consider arguing this possibility to a court.
79
Is it unfair to interpret this as suggesting that an argument on behalf
of comparative negligence would be frivolous? One hesitates to accept
that suggestion inasmuch as comparative negligence was indeed adopted
by a number of state courts within a decade of Mishkin and Morris'
ill-timed prognostication.
This is one of many possible examples to support the genealogy
of law described by Professor Risinger: "Today's frivolity may be
tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an organic process in which
a concept is conceived, then derided as absurd (and clearly not the law),
then accepted as theoretically tenable (though not the law), then accepted
as the law."80 Professor Risinger cites other examples of legal arguments
made in the face of apparently overwhelming authority to the contrary,
including pre-1954 suggestions that 'separate but equal' was not really
a constitutionally tenable standard, regardless of existing Supreme Court
precedents. Thus, he concludes that "a court should be very cautious
before it ever finds a ... violation based on the improper espousal of
a legal position."8'
An English judge, Lord Harman, has expressed some similar reser-
vations about assessing lawyer's arguments:
[I]f it be misconduct to take a bad point, a new peril is added to those of the
legal profession, and unless a bad point be taken knowing it to be bad and concealing
from the court, for instance, an authority which shows it clearly to be a bad point,
79 P. Mishkin & C. Morris, On Law in Courts (Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1965) at 256,
quoted in I. Englard, "Li v. Yellow Cab Co. - A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California
Civil Code" (1977) 65 Cal. L. Rev. 4 at 6-7, n.18. See also, on a more contemporary note, S.
Wermiel, "The Costs of Lawsuits, Growing Ever Larger, Disrupt the Economy" The Wall Street
Journal (16 May 1986) 1: "Cases once thought to be 'frivolous' [says Victor Schwartz, a former
law professor now practising law in Washington, D.C.], 'have become the law.' Fifteen years ago,
he says, it was considered frivolous to sue for emotional injury allegedly caused by the mere witnessing
of a car accident. 'Now, three states allow it."' Ibid. at 8.
80 D.M. Risinger, "Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some 'Striking' Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11" (1976) 61 Minn. L. Rev. I at 57 (article examining pre-
1983 version of Rule 11). Compare Professor Dworkin's recent statement that "questions considered
easy during one period become hard before they again become easy questions - with the opposite
answers'" Dworkin, supra, note 14 (concluding sentence of passage quoted above).
81 Risinger, ibid at 58.
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then it would be a very dangerous doctrine indeed to say that the advocate ought
to be muIcted in the costs because he took a point which failed.
82
Still, one is justifiably reluctant to accept the proposition that all arguments
are non-frivolous so long as someone called a lawyer is willing to make
them. After all, as a distinguished federal judge once wrote in an opinion,
"Having been many years at the Bar before being on the Bench, we
know from our own experience that there is no position - no matter
how absurd - of which an advocate cannot convince himself."83
A very good reason for such reluctance relates to the so-called
American rule regarding the payment of legal fees. The United States
rejected the English practice whereby losers in a lawsuit compensate
the winners for the costs of their attorneys fees. Instead each side bears
its own costs in the absence of specific statutory authority permitting
a court to shift costs. Rule 11 and the other rules are examples of such
authority. Indeed, Rule 11 in form requires sanctions such as fee shifting
upon a determination of frivolousness rather than merely permitting them.
It is surely no coincidence that one of the contemporary federal
judges most interested in the issue of frivolous cases is Frank Easterbrook,
who before his appointment to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
was a professor at the University of Chicago, where he drank deeply
from the well of law-and-economics identified with that school. Thus,
82 Abraham v. Jutson (1963), [1963] 2 All E.R. 402 at 404, [19631 W.L.R. 658 at 664 (C.A.),
quoted in Gold, supra, note 25 at 79 n.101. Gold also says that "there is authority which would
require a lawyer to take on a speculative cause for his client's sake and the sake of justice."
See Clyne v. Bar Association of New South Wales (1960), 104 C.L.R. 186, [1960] A.L.R. 574
(Aust. H.C.). Lewin, supra, note 29, details a recent $165,000 sanction in a case involving toxic
substances as a "perfect example of Rule I 1 gone wrong." A lawyer representing the estate of
Alan Glaser, a young doctor who had died of leukemia after working in a chemical company
during summer vacations, sued 101 manufacturers of benzene, a carcinogenic chemical used in
the facility. According to Lewin, "It is hard to establish who can be held liable for a worker's
exposure to a common chemical, and in a few cases in which it could not be determined which
company made the actual substance that caused the injury, the courts have allowed recovery from
the whole industry, dividing the damages on a market-share basis." This approach, known as 'enterprise
liability', was initially adopted by the lawyers representing Ann Glaser, the widow. "After some
pretrial proceedings, however, the lawyers found they would not need to use that theory, so they
agreed to drop 89 defendants." The judge in the case, referring to enterprise liability as a "grade
school teacher's tactic of punishing the entire class until someone in the class identifies the guilty
party," proceeded to fine the lawyers $165,000 for "meritless joinder of numerous defendants."
The lawyers are appealing to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. According to Harvard
Professor Arthur Miller, who is helping on the appeal,
Manufacturers are putting some very complex products out there, and in toxic tort cases,
a lawyer may not have the capacity to identify all the correct defendants. Sometimes the
defendant is the only one who has the information that's needed, and he won't share the
records. The only real issue about Rule 11 is whether it will chill creative lawyering, but
this is one of the very few cases where that's a problem.
Ibid at D8.
83 Wells v. Oppenheimer Co., Inc (1984), 101 F.R.D. 358 at 359 (S.D.N.Y.) (Knapp J.).
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Judge Easterbrook has written, "[S]uits are easy to file and hard to defend.
Litigation gives lawyers opportunities to impose on their adversaries costs
much greater than they impose on their own clients. The greater the
disparity, the more litigation becomes a predatory instrument rather than
a method of resolving honest disputes." 84 What Easterbrook describes
as "[a] lawyer's reckless indifference to the law may impose substantial
costs on the adverse party.... [The law] permits a court to insist that
the attorney bear the costs of his own lack of care." 85 Fee shifting,
especially if directed at the attorneys themselves, can supply an economic
control against frivolity that is otherwise lacking in the American system.
"The best way to control unjustified tactics in litigation is to ensure
that those who create costs also bear them."86
The obvious question is how to resolve the tension between the
descriptions presented by Risinger and Easterbrook, both of which capture
real truths about the practice of law. Can we fix on a definition of
frivolousness that is not either void for vagueness or otherwise too much
a threat to the genuinely innovative lawyer who is first in queue with
a new legal argument? As to vagueness, Judge Easterbrook, writing for
the Seventh Circuit, has recently noted that "[c]ourts have been imposing
penalties for frivolous litigation for hundreds of years, [cases cited] and
the ambiguities that lurk in 'frivolous' (or in any other word) in marginal
cases do not prevent the imposition of penalties. Uncertainty is a fact
of legal life."87 He goes on immediately to quote from a 1930 Supreme
Court case acknowledging that "[w]henever the law draws a line there
will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course
of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing
that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the...
law to make him take the risk."88
Judge Easterbrook emphasizes the objective nature of the inquiry.
"If a person should have known that his position is groundless, a court
may and should impose sanctions."89 He sharply rejects a subjective
standard of bad faith. "An obtuse belief - even if sincerely held -
is no refuge, no warrant for imposing delay on the legal system and
84 Re TCI Ltd (1985), 769 F.2d 441 at 446 (7th Cir.).
85 Ibid. at 445.
86 Ibid at 446.
87 Coleman v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue (1986), 791 F. 2d 68 at 71 (7th Cir.) (Emphasis
added).
88 United States v. Wurzbach (1930), 280 U.S. 396 at 399.
89 Coleman, supra, note 87 at 71.
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costs on one's adversaries. The more costly obtuseness becomes, the less
there will be."90
In private correspondence, Judge Easterbrook has suggested that
something is frivolous only when (a) we've decided the very point, and recently,
against the person reasserting it, or (b) 99 of 100 practicing lawyers would be
99% sure that the position is untenable, and the other 1% would be 60% sure
it's untenable. Either one is a pretty stiff test.91
My colleague Douglas Laycock has pointed to a potential ambiguity
in Judge Easterbrook's formulation generated by the word "untenable."
One meaning would make "tenable" synonymous with a prediction as
to the actual likelihood of the position prevailing. This would allow,
for example, each of the one hundred lawyers to indicate beliefs both
that a) the position would in fact lose and b) the position is eminently
reasonable albeit a loser. Thus, under this interpretation, at least one
of the respondents would have to be actually persuaded by the argument
and predict its acceptance in order for a case not to be deemed frivolous.
The second meaning makes 'untenable' more synonymous with what
we as professors might regard as a failing, rather than merely a C minus,
performance. That is, to describe an argument as 'untenable' is indeed
to pronounce it at the very same time as 'unreasonable' and therefore
'frivolous'.
Yet Judge Easterbrook's comment does suggest a way that courts
might in fact handle the frivolousness issue. Practicing attorneys (and
perhaps law professors as well) might be impaneled to provide advice
to judges whenever a claim of legal frivolity is made by a losing party.
If one is particularly worried about preventing the attribution of frivo-
90 Ibid See also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEO.C. (1978), 434 U.S. 412 at 421, where
the Supreme Court held that attorney's fees can be recovered from the plaintiff in an employment
discrimination suit only if the court finds "that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." (Emphasis added.)
91 Letter from Judge Easterbrook to Sanford Levinson (29 January 1986). I am grateful to
Judge Easterbrook for his permission to quote from his letter, though I was cautioned to emphasize
that it is not (yet) an authoritative exposition of the law of frivolousness. See also Re Marriage
of Flaherty (1982), 31 Cal.3d 637, where the California Supreme Court held that an appeal could
be considered frivolous "when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and
completely without merit." Ibid at 650. Compare the test for the standard for proof of "lack of
probable cause" in a claim involving a suggested new tort of "groundless suit" suggested by a
student note in the Yale Law Journal: The complainant "would have to demonstrate such an
insufficiency of reasonably reliable evidence that no reasonable person confronted with such evidence
could have believed that the action brought might succeed." Note, supra, note 39 at 1235 (emphasis
added). The student author acknowledges that this "objective" test "means that a few plaintiffs
who have retained negligent counsel and sued in good faith on the strength of counsel's advice
may be subject to ultimate liability." Ibid at 1236, n.124. The author goes on to advocate the
right of "innocent plaintiffs who are misled by their attorneys into filing wrongful suits to recover
from their lawyers in subsequent malpractice actions on proof of simple negligence." Ibid
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lousness to worthy arguments, the panel might be charged with a standard
of beyond reasonable doubt, that is, each must be truly certain of an
argument's utter worthlessness; all judgment calls must be resolved in
favour of the lawyer accused of presenting the frivolous argument.92 In
any event, such reliance on an actual community of lawyers, rather than
a judge's own intuition about the probable response of such a survey,
might serve to limit the possibility of political abuse that worries some
of the practicing bar. However, if one is in fact interested in deterring
frivolity through imposing sanctions, reliance on such a panel might be
counter-productive.
The Federal Judicial Center has recently conducted An Empirical
Study of Rule 11 Sanctions.93 One of ten hypothetical cases, modeled
after actual cases, was sent to federal judges who agreed to participate
in the study. Each judge indicated his or her view about any violation
of Rule 11 and a concomitant willingness to impose sanctions. The cases
mixed examples of both legal and factual frivolity. In none of the ten
cases was there a unanimous reaction, though 97 percent did agree that
one particular case, in which a suit was filed without any significant
investigation of the underlying facts, presented a violation of the rules. 94
Only two of the remaining nine cases elicited more than 75 percent
agreement. Although this is scarcely a dispositive test of Judge Easter-
brook's standard, these results certainly do not suggest the kind of shared
communal understandings required if the standard is to be effective. 95
92 Compare this with the cautionary language of the California Supreme Court in Re Marriage
of Flaherty, ibid., expressing its concern that the test of frivolousness there adopted should not
have "a serious chilling effect" on the policy favoring free access to the judiciary and emphasized
that "[c]ounsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if
it is extremely unlikely that they will win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is
not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions." Ibid at 650 (emphasis in original).
Courts should be cautious in deeming an appeal "frivolous" instead of merely "without merit,"
and sanctions should "be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct." Ibid
at 651. See generally J. Cohn, "Serious Business" (August 1986) Cal. Lawyer 43.
93 S.M. Kassin, "An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions 17" (1985).
94 Even here only 85 percent would have imposed the sanctions "required" by the Rule. bid
at 55.
95 Similar doubt is generated by a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, where a retiring college teacher sued the Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association
of America (TIAA) claiming the right to receive a lump-sum payment instead of the annuity
specifically set out in the contiact. Connick v. TIAA (1986), 784 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.). The District
Court granted summary judgment for TIAA, and the Court of Appeals had no trouble affirming.
It noted that the relevant contracts "specifically state that they contain no provision for cash surrender."
Ibid at 1020. Moreover, the no-surrender provisions had been construed and upheld in at least
two reported state court decisions. Yet the panel refused the request for attorney's fees. "An appeal
is considered frivolous when the result is obvious or appellant's arguments are wholly without
merit. [Case cited.] We hold that Connick's appeal was not so lacking in merit to justify an award
of attorney fees." Ibid at 1022.
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Problems of a different sort are suggested by the response of the
Supreme Court in a 1980 case involving a petition by a prisoner alleging
unconstitutional treatment by the state of Illinois.96 The courts below
had not only dismissed the petition, but also awarded the State $400
in attorney's fees against the hapless prisoner. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed. It held that at least one of the multifarious complaints
of the prisoner stated a potential claim and vacated the award of attorney's
fees. "Even those allegations that were properly dismissed for failure
to state a claim deserved and received the careful consideration of both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals." 97
Justice Rehnquist dissented on both the merits and the award of
fees. He would have held that the claim was "meritless" in toto and
that the "award of attorney's fees was entirely proper."98 As Mark Tushnet
has written, "[I]t seems that, in Justice Rehnquist's view, a claim can
be 'meritless' even though six members of the Supreme Court found
that it stated a claim on which relief could be granted." 99 There is, to
put the matter gently, something troublesome about this willingness to
uphold an award of fees in this instance, at least if one applies the
Easterbrook standard.
Perhaps Judge Easterbrook did not expect to be taken with such
seriousness; his suggestion appears not in a published article, but in some
private thoughts that he was kind enough to share with me. But does
not his suggestion point to the underlying problem with 'frivolousness'
as an operative standard structuring the practice of law? We seem forced
into one or another difficult position. We can, on the one hand, argue
that in fact a communal consensus exists, though this rests only on assertion
rather than demonstrated evidence. However, unless we are in fact willing
to test the existence of such a consensus by reference to something like
the panel suggested above, this position in practice reduces to the
proposition that each given judge can be trusted to intuit frivolousness
when he or she sees it, as limited by appellate review. Or, alternatively,
we might throw up our hands in despair and assert that there is no
such thing as a frivolous argument: that is, that a competent lawyer
can indeed argue anything.
96 Hughes v. Rowe (1980), 449 U.S. 5. I am grateful to Mark Tushnet for bringing this case
to my attention.
97 Ibid at 15.
98 Ibid at 23.
99 Letter from Mark Tushnet to Sanford Levinson (13 June 1986).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Is there a way out of this dilemma? The fascinating thing about
the problem of frivolousness is that such cases can be recognized. 100
What can not be done, I have discovered, is to explain (or teach to
students) exactly what constitutes the frivolous case as contrasted with
those that are weak but nonetheless non-frivolous.
It is hard, perhaps impossible, to imagine a legal system that does
not include the category of 'frivolous' arguments. As I have argued from
the outset, to reject that category is to reject the central tenet of
professionalism itself and its claims to privileged knowledge. Yet there
seems to be no way of stating a recognition rule that can genuinely
avoid charges of arbitrariness and, dare I say it, radical indeterminacy.
Yet Judge Easterbrook is clearly correct in emphasizing the inability
to achieve what Justice Holmes might have called 'the repose' of a
Cartesian legal universe featuring completely certain, completely deter-
minate legal concepts. That is not our human destiny, and no serious
legal analysis can be predicated on its achievement.
My conclusion is frustratingly weak on answers. Yet the questions
themselves, I hope, have been worth asking. The one position of which
I am strongly confident is that the actual practice of law by lawyers,
especially in what are sometimes regarded as its most routine aspects,
presents puzzles that are worth our most serious attention. Certainly our
jurisprudence and perhaps even our legal practices would benefit from
at least a diminution of our obsession with judges and a closer look
at lawyers.
100 Indeed, I find persuasive most of the reported frivolous cases, including those written by
judges with political views quite different from mine, like Judge Easterbrook.
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